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Interest in the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and in other Southeast Asian countries has 
continued unabated largely because of the important role they continue to play in the econ­
omy, and in at least one country, in the polity. Not surprisingly, most studies of the ethnic 
Chinese have concentrated on these two areas.
However, the social and cultural dimensions of their role have not been entirely 
neglected.* 1 In Indonesia, the interest in these dimensions is, perhaps, also generated by the
This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the Symposium on the Role of Indonesian Chinese 
in Indonesian Life, Cornell University, July 13-15,1990. This paper with the same title, was originally presented 
at the joint CCSEAS/NWRSEA Conference at the Asian Centre of the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 
B.C., Canada, November 3-5,1989.
1See an early sociological study by Ong Eng Die, De Chineezen in Nederlandsch Indie: Sociografie van een Indone- 
sische bevolkingsgroep (The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies) (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1943), his doctoral dissertation, 
written from secondary sources while he was in the Netherlands during World War II; Edward J. Ryan, 'The 
Value System of a Chinese Community in Java" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1961). See more recent studies 
on the role of ethnic Chinese in the development of the press in Indonesia, on education, and on religion in Leo 
Suryadinata, The Pre-World War II Peranakan Chinese Press of Java: A Preliminary Survey (Athens: Ohio University 
Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Paper No. 18,1971); idem, The Chinese Minority in Indonesia, 7 
papers. (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978); idem, Kebudayaan Minoritas Tionghoa di Indonesia, (The culture of 
the Chinese minority in Indonesia), trans. Dede Oetomo (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1988). Jennifer W. Cushman and 
Wang Gungwu, eds., Changing Identities of Southeast Asian Chinese Since World War II, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1988); L. A. Peter Gosling and Linda Y. C. Lim, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, vol. 2, Identity, Cul­
ture and Politics (Singapore: Maruzen, 1983); the monumental work on what has been referred to as "Chinese- 
Malay," "Sino-Malay," or "Melayu-Tionghoa" literature, in Claudine Salmon, Literature in Malay by the Chinese of 
Indonesia: A Provisional Annotated Bibliography (Paris: de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1981). See also Myra 
Sidharta, ed .,100 Tahun Kwee Tek Hoay, Dari Penjaja Tekstil Sampai ke Pendekar Pena (100th anniversary of Kwee 
Tek Hoay, from textile peddler to fighter with the pen) (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989). Since the 1980s, a 
number of theses and dissertations have been written by Indonesian students at universities in Indonesia or 
abroad focusing on the social and cultural lives of the ethnic Chinese and their relations with the majority popu­
lation. These include: Danny Indrakusuma, "Posisi berbeda agama dalam hubungan Cina-Pribumi: Suatu studi 
tentang persepsi masyarakat Cina di Kota Solo" (Skripsi Sarjana Sosiologi, Fisipol, Universitas Airlangga, 
Surabaya, 1987); A. H. Kurniawan, "Identifikasi Pelajar SMA Keturunan Tionghoa di Jakarta" (Skripsi Sarjana
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realization that twenty-three years have passed since the New Order government imple­
mented a series of regulations with the expressed intent of accelerating the process of 
pembauran, or assimilation.2 These regulations were announced in the form of instructions or 
decisions on the presidential and ministerial level. The first, on "The Basic Policy for the 
Solution of the Chinese Problem" was promulgated in June 1967 and was followed in 
December of the same year by another on religion, beliefs, and Chinese customs.3 In 
addition, a number of specific regulations pertained to the education of ethnic Chinese 
children whose parents were Indonesian citizens as well as those whose parents were aliens.
From these regulations it is clear that for the government, assimilation, defined as the 
eventual disappearance of a group as a sociocultural entity, is the best way to resolve what 
is usually referred to as the "Chinese problem" (masalah Cina). This legacy of the colonial 
past has persisted and in some ways has been aggravated since independence. The problem 
is the existence in society of a relatively small (estimated at around 3 percent) but highly 
significant group, which the ethnic Indonesian majority perceive as alien in appearance and 
culture. In their view, the group's grip on the economy is disproportionate to its numbers, 
and it tends to segregate itself socially and residentially, a behavior they see as an arrogant 
expression of feelings of superiority. These perceived characteristics have generated resent­
ment towards the group, which at times has exploded into actions of violence against them.
One should be aware that this policy is not a product of the New Order government 
alone. President Sukarno also espoused the idea of assimilation, although he was not as 
insistent about it as the present government. At the time, he also allowed an opposing view 
to flourish, no doubt to balance the assimilationist view. This opposite view, propounded by 
the ethnic Chinese mass organization Baperki, supported integration rather than assimila­
tion.4 Baperki defined integration to mean the acceptance of the ethnic Chinese as an inte­
gral part of Indonesian society by recognizing the validity of their existence as a social entity 
similar to indigenous ethnic groups. In the aftermath of the 1965 abortive coup, this organi­
zation was banned because of its close relations with the Indonesian Communist party.
Since 1965, assimilationist perspective has prevailed, and the present government seems 
determined to accelerate the process through regulation. It is evident that the cultural factor
Sosiologi, Fisip-UI, 1984); Dede Oetomo, "The Chinese of Pasuruan: A Study of Language and Identity in a 
Minority Community in Transition" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1984); Stephen Suleeman, "Persepsi 
golongan keturunan Tionghoa Indonesia terhadap golongan bumi putera" (Skripsi Sarjana Ilmu Komunikasi, 
1986); and Hendra Sutedjo, "Komunikasi dan tingkat suami-istri perkawinan campuran" (Skripsi Sarjana Ilmu 
Komunikasi, Fisip-UI, 1984).
^The root of this word is baur, meaning to mix. In the context of intergroup relations in Indonesia, it means "to 
assimilate."
^Instruction of the Cabinet Presidium no. 37/U/IN/6/1967, 'The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese 
Problem," sanctioned in Jakarta on June 7,1967, and signed by Suharto as chairman of the Ampera Cabinet Pre­
sidium; Instruction of the president of the Republic of Indonesia no. 14,1967, on religion, beliefs, and Chinese 
customs sanctioned in Jakarta on December 6,1967, and signed by Suharto as acting president of the Republic of 
Indonesia; Coordinating Body for the Chinese Problem—Coordinating Body for National Intelligence, comp., 
Pedoman penyelesaian masalah Cina di Indonesia (Handbook for the resolution of the Chinese problem in Indonesia), 
vol. 1 (Bakin: Jakarta, 1979). Volume 1 comprises the policies for the resolution of the Chinese problem, the tech­
nical instructions, and a compilation of the laws for the basic policies. Volume 2 is a compilation of the laws con­
cerning the general handbook (pedoman umum), and volume 3 is a compilation of the laws concerning policy 
implementation and implementation organization.
^The Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) was 
established in March 1954. It participated in the national elections of 1955 and received wide support in the eth­
nic Chinese community.
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is considered the main obstacle to this process. Hence as stated in the regulations, 
"Guidance in assimilation in the framework of the realization of unity of the nation should 
be geared towards the establishment of unity in the value system." To this end, "All forms 
of cultural affinity based on the country of origin should be removed, in order to give all 
elements of culture in Indonesia the opportunity to develop according to the Pancasila."5
In view of the importance given to the cultural factor it seems appropriate to assess how 
these regulations have been implemented and how the ethnic Chinese have responded to 
them. No doubt these responses have varied in time and place by age and cultural orienta­
tion. Nonetheless, indications are that the general response has been compliance, albeit 
sometimes mixed with covert reluctance. Whenever possible, however, people also attempt 
to ignore or get around the regulations.
This attitude of compliance can be seen as a manifestation of the powerlessness of the 
ethnic Chinese and their total lack of bargaining power. Although they are perceived by the 
ethnic Indonesian majority to dominate the economy, a recent event vividly illustrates their 
weak position—the response of ethnic Chinese big businessmen to the appeal of President 
Suharto on March 4,1990, to sell up to 25 percent of the shares of their companies to cooper­
atives. Although their immediate response was positive, recognizing the validity of Suhar­
to's expressed motivation—the concern for the effects of social inequity—they later noted 
privately as well as publicly the grave uncertainties in the implementation of the idea. Still, 
their overall response again was compliance.6
An assessment of the persistent Chinese problem is pertinent now that the Indonesian 
government has finally resumed diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China 
after freezing relations for twenty-three years. This prolonged freeze is alleged to be owing 
to the view, espoused especially among the military, that normalization should be contin­
gent on the resolution of this problem within the country.
The Memorandum of Understanding was duly signed by the respective foreign minis­
ters in Jakarta on August 8,1990, and witnessed by President Suharto and Prime Minister Li 
Peng of the PRC. Interestingly, of the four paragraphs of the document, two deal with dual 
nationality (referring to Indonesian citizens of Chinese origin) and noninterference with 
each other's domestic affairs.7 This mention is widely seen as a recognition of the existence 
of the Chinese problem in Indonesia as indicated by the writings on ethnic Chinese that pro­
liferated in the mass media around the event.
In view of this development, one might ask whether the government considers this 
problem resolved, in other words, that assimilation has been achieved, or that other consid­
erations have prevailed and under the circumstances it is simply considered irrelevant. The
^Coordinating Body for the Chinese Problem, Pedoman, vol. 1.
6This appeal was made on March 4,1990, when President Suharto invited thirty-one big businessmen (now 
popularly referred to as "conglomerates"), twenty-nine of them ethnic Chinese, to his cattle ranch, Tapos, in the 
Bogor area. In a speech that lasted about 1.5 hours and was broadcast in its entirety on national TV the same 
evening, he exhorted them, now that they had become wealthy, not the least because of the opportunities given 
by the New Order government, to express their gratitude for this good fortune. The gist of his appeal was that 
big businesses should sell up to 25 percent of their shares to cooperatives. In this way, he contended, "social 
envy" (kecemburuan sosial), which can lead to social unrest, could be avoided. Small businesses, represented by 
cooperatives, would feel that they had a share in big business and that, therefore, they also had a stake in keeping 
them going. See Tempo, especially March 10 and April 14,1990, for the names of the businessmen invited; see 
also Editor, April 14,1990.
7From the English translation of the document.
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latter seems to be the case if one looks at trade relations, which have flourished since the 
signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on trade between the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Indonesia and the PRC in 1985.8
A review of the regulations enacted by the New Order government to resolve the 
Chinese problem, how they have been implemented, and how the ethnic Chinese have 
responded to them follows.
Regulations Concerning the Ethnic Chinese
As indicated, the most comprehensive regulation was contained in the instruction of 
June 1967 on the basic policies for the resolution of the Chinese problem. This regulation 
spells out the rationale for allowing foreign nationals to continue to operate in Indonesia. 
The considerations put forward are as follows:
that in the framework of development, all resources should be marshalled, including 
those belonging to foreign nationals; that to accelerate the process of development the 
efforts of citizens should be increased, while the capital/financial resources and enter­
prises of foreign nationals should be put to use correctly in the right proportion; that in 
the spirit of the Pancasila philosophy, the principles of a state based on law, and moti­
vated by the desire to have good relations with all countries. . .  it is necessary to reeval­
uate, review, the policies concerning foreign nationals, in particular the Chinese 
problem.9
These instructions were to be implemented by "all bodies and the apparatus of the gov­
ernment, both civil and military, by the central as well as the local governments."10 It was 
also stipulated that they were specifically directed toward Chinese foreign nationals. They 
deal with the requirements for obtaining a work permit and a license to operate an enter­
prise and with foreign capital that is considered "foreign domestic capital" and is, therefore, 
"national wealth that is in the hands of foreign inhabitants, and as such should be mar­
shalled, developed and made use of, for the benefit of rehabilitation and development." The 
government does not permit this foreign domestic capital to be transferred abroad.
The regulation includes a section that urges children of foreign nationals who have 
become residents of Indonesia to attend government as well as private schools that follow 
the national curriculum. An item on organization stipulates that with the permission and 
control of local authorities, only organizations related to health, religion, death, sports, and 
recreation will be allowed in certain areas with a sufficient number of foreign nationals. In 
addition, there is a special section on relations with the PRC; relations at that time were 
extremely strained but not yet severed (they dissolved four months later in October 1967).
The final part of this instruction concerned the implementation of the regulation and the 
August 1967 establishment of a special staff, Staf Khusus Urusan Cina, or SKUT (Special 
Staff for Chinese Affairs), which was directly responsible to the chairman of the Cabinet 
Presidium, that is, the president. Charged with the task of assisting the minister of political 
affairs in the resolution of the Chinese Problem, the special staff was responsible for coordi­
nating and monitoring the implementation of the policies, especially those related to the
8Signed by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade on July 5,1988, in Singapore. After the historic meeting in Tokyo in April 1988 between Pres­
ident Suharto and the foreign minister of the PRC, when the foundation was laid for the resumption of diplo­
matic relations, technical follow-up meetings occurred.
9See n. 3, this article.
10Ibid.
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Chinese Problem. In the discharge of its task, the special staff could cooperate with other 
government agencies or with relevant private organizations.11
Two regulations, which could be considered elaborations on the instruction, were prob­
ably generated by this special staff: the instruction on religion, beliefs, and Chinese customs 
implemented in December 1967 and the basic policies concerning Indonesian citizens of for­
eign descent.12 The first document was directed to the ministers of Religious Affairs and 
Internal Affairs and to other relevant government agencies on the central and local levels 
and concerned those aspects of Chinese religious behavior that showed cultural affinity 
with their country of origin. According to this instruction, such religious beliefs should only 
be expressed privately, and festivals related to Chinese religion and Chinese tradition 
should be celebrated within the confines of the home.
The second document deals specifically with Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. It 
reiterates that before the law all citizens, including those of foreign descent, have the same 
rights and responsibilities. It also stipulates that they should be guided through the process 
of assimilation in order to avoid so-called racial exclusiveness. Furthermore, it states that 
discrimination does not exist because citizens of foreign descent are given the same oppor­
tunity as indigenous citizens "to marshall resources in all fields in order to accelerate devel­
opment." Those with Chinese names, however, are urged to change them to Indonesian- 
sounding names.
Another regulation included in the Resolution of the Provisional People's Consultative 
Assembly no. 32,1966 concerns the use of Chinese language and script in the mass media. It 
states that there will be only one Chinese-language newspaper (subsequently called Harian 
Indonesia), sponsored and controlled by the government.
As mentioned earlier, a number of regulations concerned education. Because Chinese- 
language schools had been central to the perpetuation of Chinese culture, these regulations 
deserve careful attention. Chinese schools have had a history of trials and tribulations that 
dates to the late 1950s, when the Central Military Command ordered all schools set up by 
organizations of "orang-orang Tionghoa Perantauan (Hoa Kiaw)" who were not citizens of a 
country that had diplomatic relations with Indonesia (in this case, Taiwan) to be closed. 
They were closed in October 1958. In 1957, schools with the same type of sponsorship in the 
Nusa Tenggara area were prohibited by order of the regional military command.13 These 
actions put an end to all schools set up by the Kuomintang or its sympathizers. In line with 
Indonesia's one-China policy, however, schools sponsored by PRC organizations were still 
allowed to operate. In the aftermath of the 1965 upheaval, violence was directed toward 
them, and they were also ordered to close. This prohibition was formalized by the decision 
of the minister of Education and Culture in July 1966.
^Laporan Tahunan 1968, Staf Urusan Cina (Jakarta: Kabinet Pembangunan Republik Indonesia, 1968).
12See Presidential Instruction no. 14/1967 signed by Suharto, then acting president on December 6,1967, and 
Presidential Decision no. 240/1967 on basic policies concerning Indonesian citizens of foreign descent.
13Sardjono Sigit, Asimilasi Pendidikan: Pokok-pokok Riwayat dan Permasalahannya (Jakarta: Departemen Pen- 
didikan dan Kebudayaan, 1981) relates the history of foreign schools or international schools in Indonesia—the 
actions taken against the Dutch language schools in 1957, the Kuomintang Chinese language schools in 1957- 
1958, and the schools sponsored by the PRC and PRC sympathizers in 1965-1966; the banning of all Chinese 
language schools from 1966-1968 and the Special Project National Schools from 1968-1974; and the history of the 
laws for implementing assimilation in education and the regulations concerning foreign language and 
international schools.
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Nonetheless, in 1968, the government allowed a group of wealthy Chinese (known 
Taiwan sympathizers) to establish schools for the students of the banned schools because 
many of them could not be accommodated by existing schools. The Sekolah Nasional 
Proyek Khusus (Special Project National Schools) had to follow the national curriculum but 
were allowed to teach the Chinese language as an extracurricular activity. They became very 
popular; in 1970 there were eight schools in Jakarta, and by 1973 there were thirty-five 
schools in Sumatra alone.14
This development alarmed the government because some of the schools allegedly used 
Chinese as the medium of instruction. In 1974, the government closed them; the reason 
given was that the transitional period for the adjustment of former Chinese school pupils 
had terminated. This regulation marked the end of formal education in the Chinese 
language, thereby closing any avenue for systematic Chinese enculturation. Nonetheless, 
the government still thought that special instruction toward assimilation was necessary. The 
minister of Education then set up an assistance team for the implementation of assimilation 
in education and the regulation of foreign schools. These schools became known as Sekolah 
Pembauran.15
The implementation of the regulations concerned with the social and cultural lives of the 
ethnic Chinese was not as definitive and consistent as it was for regulations on education. In 
many situations, implementation was determined by the attitude of the local authorities 
toward ethnic Chinese. For example, activities in Chinese temples continued, and in some of 
the renowned ones—among others, the temple at Tanjungkait on the northern coast of 
Banten in West Java and the Sam Po Kong Temple in Semarang in Central Java—festivals 
are still drawing visitors from surrounding cities. These festivities have also started to spill 
outside the temple grounds, which could not have happened without permits from the local 
authorities.
On the other hand, in the beginning of 1989, a performance in Medan of the Chinese 
play Sam Pek Eng Thai (the Chinese version of Romeo and Juliette) adapted (the location was 
old-time Batavia) by the playwright Riantiamo of Teater Koma was abruptly canceled. Only 
on opening day did the authorities inform him that permission for the performance was not 
granted. The reason given was that because the opening day happened to be a national 
holiday, it would be inappropriate to have a public performance of a Chinese play. The 
authorities appeared to object also to the dragon dance in the play. It is interesting to note 
that the same play had been performed to wide acclaim in Jakarta in the prestigious Gedung 
Kesenian. Some months before that event, a similar fate befell an opera troupe from Taiwan. 
They were informed about the refusal of their permit after they had arrived in Jakarta.
The denial of permits in these two cases, in which the objection was against the 
Chineseness of the play or show, gives an impression of arbitrariness on the part of the 
authorities. Yet Mandarin movies and video cassettes from Hongkong may be shown or 
rented, and Mandarin-speaking entertainers regularly perform in hotels and nightclubs.
14Ibid.
^For a number of years when these schools began, I lectured to their supervisors (pengawas) on the cultural 
background of the ethnic Chinese to improve the supervisors' understanding of Chinese culture. During the dis­
cussion period, invariably at least one participant would comment on the problem faced of teaching the students 
Pancasila at school, only to have them influenced by Chinese culture at home. The question then raised was 
What can be done to eliminate this influence of Chinese culture?
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A review of the implementation of the regulations indicates that the government has 
enforced most consistently restrictions on Chinese-language schools, the use of Chinese 
script in public places, and the sale of Chinese-language publications.
Responses of the Ethnic Chinese
Scholars studying the ethnic Chinese16 still tend to treat them as a monolithic entity by 
referring to all of them as "Chinese" or "overseas Chinese." In Indonesia, this tendency is 
apparent among the majority population in the use of the terms orang Cina, orang Tionghoat 
or even hoakiau.171 contend that these terms only apply to those who are alien, not of mixed 
ancestry, and who initially do not plan to stay in Indonesia permanently. The terms and the 
definition used for this group have important implications culturally, socially, and psycho­
logically, especially for policy considerations and policy implementation.
As indicated in recent writings, the term commonly used today to refer to the group as a 
whole is "ethnic Chinese," regardless of citizenship, cultural orientation, or social identifi­
cation. "Ethnic Chinese" refers to a group with cultural elements recognizable as or 
attributable to Chinese culture, whereas socially, members of this group identify with and 
are identified by others as a distinct group.
To identify the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, however, is not easy. First they must be 
differentiated by citizenship into aliens and citizens and then by cultural orientation and 
social identification. Cultural orientation and social identification are a continuum. At one 
end are those, mostly of the younger generation, who identify completely and solely as 
Indonesian and whose cultural orientation is also Indonesian. Examples of individuals in 
this category are the late Soe Hok Gie, a student activist during the 1965-1966 upheaval, and 
his social scientist brother, Arief Budiman, who is known for his critical views of the devel­
opment process in Indonesia, and who is married to a Minangkabau woman. Then there are 
Jusuf Wanandi, one of the directors of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, his 
brother, Sofjan Wanandi, one of the big businessmen, and Christianto Wibisono, director 
and owner of the nationally known Indonesian Business Data Center. All of them were 
prominent student activists during the 1965-1966 upheaval and are known as members of 
the "1966 generation."
There are also artists, like the nationally renowned playwright and film director Teguh 
Karya; Teguh Srimulat, the owner-director of the long highly popular folk theater, Srimulat; 
and the famous comedian, Ateng. One should also mention sports figures like Verawati 
Fadjrin, who several times became women's champion in international badminton competi­
tions; she is a convert to Islam and is married to an ethnic Indonesian businessman.18
A number of exceptional figures belong at this end of the continuum. K. Sindhunata, a 
Catholic peranakan, is a lawyer and officer in the Indonesian Navy (now retired), who in the
16This section on the responses of the ethnic Chinese to the aforementioned government regulations is based 
mainly on Mcly G. Tan, "The Role of the fsic] Ethnic Chinese Minority in Development: The Indonesian Case," 
Southeast Asian Studies, 25, (3) (December 1987): 63-83.
17The terms orang Cina and orang Tionghoa are Indonesian for "Chinese," whereas hoakiau is a Chinese (Hokkien) 
term meaning "overseas Chinese." It should be noted that the term Cina, or Cino in Javanese, is still considered 
by ethnic Chinese to have a derogatory meaning, especially in Java.
18These names can be found in Apa dan Siapa Sejumlah Orang Indonesia 1983-84 (Who's Who in Indonesia 1983- 
84), comp. Tempo (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1984). A biography recently appeared of Teguh Srimulat, who is not gen­
erally known to be of Chinese origin, which mentions the Chinese names of his parents. See Herry Gendut 
Janarto, Teguh Srimulat. Berpacu dalam Komedi dan Melodi (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990), p. 24.
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early sixties was one of the initiators of a group that became known as assimilationists. Haji 
Junus Jahja, a Dutch-educated economist, became known because of his well-publicized 
view that the solution to the Chinese problem is the mass conversion of the ethnic Chinese 
to Islam. Yet another exceptional figure is the businessman Bob Hasan, known as the 
"Rattan King," who also is the main promoter and financier of popular sports events.
At the other end of the continuum are those people usually referred to as totok, who are 
Chinese oriented culturally. They typically have had a Chinese-language education and 
speak Mandarin or one of the Chinese dialects with one another. Most have Indonesian citi­
zenship through naturalization or, if bom in Indonesia, through the various laws enacted 
and implemented in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the businessmen often referred to in the 
foreign press fall in this category: Liem Sioe Liong, or Sudono Salim; Mochtar Riady; The 
Nin King; Go Swie Kie; and Eka Tjipta Wijaya, among others.19
Between these two categories is a whole range of people in various stages of accultura­
tion to and identification with Indonesian society, who are commonly referred to as perana- 
kan, people of mixed ancestry. Their daily language is Indonesian, spoken often along with 
the local language of the region in which they were bom. Many have become Protestant or 
Catholic; more recently, some have converted to Islam.
How have the ethnic Chinese responded to these measures that directly or indirectly 
affect their cultural and social lives? A brief review of their thinking and actions shows that 
they have been by no means united in their efforts to find a solution to the Chinese problem. 
Four lines of thought have emerged since independence.20
The most notable line of thought was propounded by Baperki, the ethnic Chinese mass 
organization mentioned earlier, which was formed in March 1954. From the beginning, this 
organization received the support of the ethnic Chinese, but when it became closely 
associated with the Indonesian Communist party under the leadership of the late Siauw 
Giok Tjhan, many of the other leading figures resigned. The line of thought proposed by this 
organization-was integration, by which they meant the acceptance of the ethnic Chinese as a 
suku, or ethnic group, similar to indigenous ethnic groups. Thus, the group would be 
considered an integral part of Indonesian society without being dissolved as a sociocultural 
entity. In Siauw's view, this situation would be achieved only when Indonesia became a 
Socialist state. After the 1965 coup, Baperki was banned, and its leaders were detained.
The opposite view was expounded by a group mostly of young intellectuals, who in 
March 1960 announced a "statement of assimilation" in the magazine Star Weekly. This 
proclamation was the start of a movement that espoused the complete dissolution of the 
group and its absorption into various indigenous ethnic groups. Members of this group
19For an expose of the business activities of these figures see, among others, Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise 
of Capital (North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Yoshihara Kunio, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Yoon Hwan Shin, "Demystifying the Capitalist State: Political 
Patronage, Bureaucratic Interests, and Capitalist-in-Formation in Soeharto's Indonesia" (Ph.D. diss., Yale Univer­
sity, 1989).
20The ideas propounded by Baperki, Yap Thiam Hien, and the assimilationists are based on various writings in 
Leo Suryadinata, Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1977, A Source Book (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1979). For the assimilationists, see also Charles Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983). The ideas of Junus Jahja are taken from Junus Jahja, Zamam harapan bagi 
keturunan Tionghoa: Rekaman dakwah Islamiyah 1979-1984 (Era of hope for the people of Chinese descent: A 
recording of the propagation of Islam 1979-1984), ed. Junus Jahja (Jakarta: Yayasan Ukhuwah Islamiyah, 1984). 
See also, idem, Catatan Seorang WNI. Otobiografi (Notes of an Indonesian citizen. Autobiography) (Jakarta: 
Yayasan Tunas Bangsa, 1988).
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became part of the Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (Institute for the Promotion of 
National Unity), or LPKB. This group was not a mass organization but consisted of a full 
board of officers with specified tasks. Known as the assimilationists, they received the sup­
port of the government and especially of the military. From its inception to the present, the 
leading figure in this group has been K. Sindhunata, mentioned earlier. After 1965, the 
group continued to receive support from the government, and in 1977, changed its name to 
Bakom-PKB (Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa or Communication Body 
for the Appreciation of National Unity). This organization came under the aegis of the 
Department of Internal Affairs.
Yet another view was proposed by the late Yap Thiam Hien, a prominent lawyer and 
Christian church leader. His ideas have been called pluralist by Suryadinata. I prefer the 
term religionist, however, for they are based on his deep sense of religion and his total 
commitment to fundamental human rights. The "therapies" he proposed were "heart­
cleansing," a change in attitude to becoming "Christian-centered" and "the rebirth of man in 
Jesus Christ," hence the term religionist. His was a rather lone voice because most ethnic 
Chinese consider it improbable that a Christian approach would receive a favorable 
response in a predominantly Muslim society.
More recently, another religionist approach emerged with the ideas of Junus Jahja, an 
activist of the LPKB who continued as an officer of the Bakom-PKB. He became a Muslim in 
June 1979, married a Muslim woman a few years later, and served as a member of the 
prestigious Majelis Ulama Indonesia Pusat (Central Council of Indonesian Ulamas) for the 
period 1980-1985.21 Junus espouses the idea that the solution to the Chinese problem lies in 
the mass conversion of the group to Islam. In his opinion, sharing the same religion would 
remove all the barriers between the majority ethnic Indonesians and the minority ethnic 
Chinese. To this end, he set up a foundation called Yayasan Ukhuwah Islamiyah 
(Foundation for Islamic Brotherhood) as the vehicle to spread Islam among the ethnic 
Chinese. He is quite realistic about its limited prospects for success, however, and acknowl­
edges that despite favorable press coverage from 1979 througth 1984 only an estimated 
twenty thousand converted; at one point he had mentioned a target of about two hundred 
thousand.
Of these four lines of thought, only the Bakom-PKB and Junus Jahja's Muslim group are 
still active and vocal today. The Bakom-PKB has an executive board in most cities that have 
sizable ethnic Chinese communities. The appointment of prominent ethnic Chinese to the 
board is with the blessing of the local office of the Bureau for Social and Political Affairs of 
the Department of Internal Affairs. In many ways, this board functions as a liaison between 
the government and the ethnic Chinese community. Junus Jahja with his Ukhuwah 
Islamiyah foundation seeks to recruit new converts and deepen the knowledge of Islam of 
those already converted by encouraging them to open their homes for prayer meetings and 
religious study. Junus's efforts have the full support of the Muslim leadership and promi­
nent people in the government.
To what extent do ethnic Chinese share the idea of assimilation either through absorp­
tion in the various ethnic groups of their regions as propounded by the assimilationists or 
through conversion to Islam as advocated by Junus Jahya? Neither of these approaches 
appears to be attractive to most ethnic Chinese; they see the first as having coercive
21 Another ethnic Chinese who served in the council was the late Abdul Karim Oey, a Moslem of long standing. 
No doubt the late Hamka, prominent Moslem leader and thinker, played an important role in these conversions 
and in bringing these new converts into the mainstream Moslem group.
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elements and the second, conversion to Islam, as too drastic, a measure that would require a 
complete change in one's way of life.
The approach most favored is usually stated as "secara wajar" (in a natural way), 
through a process of sharing important aspects of life in education, work, and organizational 
spheres with indigenous Indonesians. This approach is carried out primarily on the 
individual level. This natural process is facilitated, for example, by participation in the activ­
ities of mainstream social organizations and political parties. This phenomenon is by no 
means new; after independence, individual ethnic Chinese became active members of exist­
ing political parties. Following the 1965 abortive coup, however, ethnic Chinese as a group 
tended to refrain from active participation in politics, although a few individuals continued 
to do so in a low-key way.
Recently, however, this low-profile attitude has given way to a more visible stance. For 
example, during the campaign period in the parliamentary election of April 1987, Dutch- 
educated economist and businessman Kwik Kian Gie came to the fore in the smallest camp 
of the three contestants in the election, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), or Indonesian 
Democratic Party. His activities rated mention in the Far Eastern Economic Review: "The 
diverse nature of the party's appeal has been symbolized by the appearance of Chinese- 
Indonesian PDI leader Kwik Kian Gie at major rallies." The article also noted that "Kwik, a 
leading businessman, has even highlighted his Chinese origin in at least one PDI rally."22 It 
remains to be seen whether this is an isolated phenomenon or the beginning of a trend 
toward greater participation and fuller acceptance for ethnic Chinese in the sociopolitical 
arena.
Other changes are taking place in the social and cultural lives of the ethnic Chinese, 
especially among the younger generation. For instance, changing patterns of education have 
led to generational differences in language use at home and among members of the ethnic 
Chinese community, especially in Java. Whereas among the older generation some still 
speak good Mandarin or a mixture of Mandarin, Malay-Indonesian, and Javanese; and a 
very few speak fluent Dutch or a mixture of Malay-Indonesian with Dutch loanwords, the 
younger generation speaks only Indonesian or a mixture of Malay-Indonesian.23
There have also been changes in religion. The younger generation is moving away from 
traditional "Chinese religion," which in Indonesia consists primarily of ancestor veneration 
at home and of certain Chinese festivals, toward conversion to Catholicism or Protestantism 
and, more recently, to Islam. It is not uncommon in ethnic Chinese families today to find the 
children Catholic or Protestant, the mother still adhering to Chinese religion, and the father 
not professing any religion at all. Yet, on his identity card he may claim to be Buddhist or 
even Protestant, for since the 1965 upheaval, to leave the category for religion blank exposes 
him to suspicion that he is a Communist.
Interethnic marriage is also occurring but mostly when both parties are Christian. The 
incidence of marriage when one of the parties is Muslim is much lower. For instance, a 
study in Jakarta shows that of the 175 ethnic Chinese-ethnic Indonesian marriages recorded
22F«r Eastern Economic Review, April 23, 1987. Recently, Kwik sold his business, an agency for European elec­
tronic equipment, apparently "in order to devote himself entirely to politics." He was rumored to be on the verge 
of bankruptcy, probably because his outspoken criticism of certain business policies and practices made it 
difficult for him to keep his business going.
23This language use by ethnic Chinese in Pasuruan, a small town in East Java, is described in Oetomo, "Chinese 
of Pasuruan," pp. 455-63, 467-527. This is a clear example of the cultural variety within the ethnic Chinese 
group, which is also based on age and "social class."
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at the Civil Registration Office in 1982 only 13 percent were between Christians and 
Moslems.24 Apparently, the parents of both parties play an important role in these cases. On 
the Muslim side is the requirement that the non-Muslim party convert to Islam, whereas on 
the non-Muslim side, especially if the child is a daughter, the gravest parental concern is 
that, because in Muslim law a man is allowed to have more than one wife, she may find 
herself in the position of having to share her husband, or if she refuses to be made a co-wife, 
requesting a divorce.
An aspect that has not changed much is the persistence of stereotypes. Among ethnic 
Chinese the view persists that ethnic Indonesians are unwilling to work hard, that they are 
wasteful, and that "if they have no money, they will ask from us, sometimes with a veiled 
threat"; hence "as long as they like money, we are safe."25 Conversely, the stereotypes 
among ethnic Indonesians about ethnic Chinese also persist that they are very rich; that they 
are only out to make as much money as possible; that they are arrogant and feel superior, 
which is reflected in their tendency to be "exclusive," that is, to segregate in plush real estate 
areas and to stay away from neighborhood mutual help activities.
Mutually negative stereotypes also persist among totok and peranakan that reflect the 
continuing lack of social interaction between them. In a study in Solo, researchers found that 
more totok than peranakan have become Muslim. Peranakans who were asked about this 
finding opined that the totok convert to Islam because they think it is advantageous for 
business, intimating that the totok will do anything to promote their businesses. The totok, 
on the other hand, look down on peranakan as "wong londo" (Dutch) because they speak 
Dutch among themselves, or as pribumi because they speak Malay-Indonesian or Javanese 
only. The totok especially resent Dutch-speaking peranakan because they see such language 
use as an expression of peranakan feelings of superiority.26
The attitude of the younger generation of ethnic Chinese toward their position in Indo­
nesian society deserves closer examination. This group experienced neither the colonial 
regime, when the population was systematically divided by race, the Japanese occupation, 
when all ethnic Chinese were treated as one group, the turbulence of the revolution, when 
ethnic Chinese were accused of collaborating with the Dutch, nor the controversy about 
assimilation and integration in the latter part of the Sukarno era. They do know that during 
the upheaval of 1965-1966, ethnic Chinese youths participated in the demonstrations against 
the Sukarno government and that some of them were recognized as leading figures in the 
then strong and influential student movement.
As a result, they seem more positive about their identity as Indonesians. At the same 
time, this identification makes them feel more frustrated when they experience discrimina­
tion. For instance, a special code is attached to the serial number of their identity cards and 
passports, indicating that they are citizens of foreign descent.27 They resent the fact that
24Sutedjo, "Komunikasi," pp. 66-68.
25Oetomo, "Chinese of Pasuruan," pp. 134-41.
26Indrakusuma, "Posisi berbeda agama," pp. 63-76. See also, Oetomo, "Chinese of Pasuruan," p. 436.
27This matter came up at a seminar organized by Tarumanegara University (a private university with a predom­
inantly ethnic Chinese student body) on March 10,1990, on the occasion of the establishment of a center for the 
study of nation building (Pusat Kajian Kesatuan dan Persatuan Bangsa). The keynote speech was given by Minis­
ter of Internal Affairs Rudini. During the discussion period, one of the faculty members, a pribumi who teaches 
kewiraan, which includes civics, asked about the special codes. As he put it, when his students asked him about 
this, he was at a loss about how to answer them. The minister replied that he would look into it, and if this really 
were true, it should immediately be stopped. Apparently, in Jakarta, those of foreign descent (Chinese, Arab, In­
dian, Dutch) have a zero in the group of numbers after the serial number of the village (kelurahan). According to
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assimilation is a one-way process; only they are expected to adjust and comply. Hence 
according to the results of a recent study in Sukabumi,28 the younger generation tends to 
withdraw within its own group and to strengthen its ethnic Chinese identity. If they don't 
emphasize their Chineseness, they at least see themselves as different from the ethnic Indo­
nesians.
The feeling of being discriminated against, even after having complied with all the New 
Order regulations pertaining to their social and cultural lives, has given rise to an assertive­
ness that is new to the ethnic Chinese. This attitude is expressed in an insistence on the con­
sistent implementation of the principle of two types of citizenship only: the Warga Negara 
Republik Indonesia or WNRI or WNI (Indonesian citizen) and the Warga Negara Asing or 
WNA (alien), meaning that all citizens should be treated the same, regardless of ethnic 
origin, and similarly, all aliens should be treated the same, including those of Chinese 
origin. This view has been stated on many occasions by Sindhunata as chairman of the 
Bakom-PKB and by Lie Tek Tjeng, a historian affiliated with the Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences (LIPI) and a widely recognized (including by the military) expert on Indonesia- 
China relations.
Furthermore, expression of the view that assimilation should not necessarily mean the 
disappearance of the ethnic Chinese as a group is increasingly open. For instance, Harry 
Tjan Silalahi, one of the directors of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a 
former member of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), was quoted in an interview 
in Suara Pembaruan, the major afternoon paper, as saying, "Assimilation should not elimi­
nate diversity" (pembauran jangan menghilangkan kebhinekaan). He stated that assimila­
tion cannot be forced on people but should be promoted through persuasion and regulation. 
He went on to say that this should be done by creating situations in which the two groups 
can interact more freely. He suggested that this approach means providing more opportu­
nities for ethnic Chinese to enter government schools, the army, and the civil service.
Sofjan Wanandi, who subsequently became the spokesman for the group of businessmen 
invited to Tapos, was quoted in a meeting of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry as raising the question of why more pribumi big businessmen were not included in 
the meeting at Tapos, suggesting perhaps that this could be seen as exclusivism in reverse.
This kind of open questioning of the policy of assimilation and its implementation indi­
cates a feeling among the ethnic Chinese of greater security in their identification as Indone­
sians, accompanied by a sense of being treated unfairly. Despite full compliance with the 
regulations governing their social and cultural lives, they feel they are still not appreciated, 
recognized, or accepted as full-fledged fellow citizens by the ethnic Indonesian majority. 
They now insist more strongly that assimilation should be a two-way street.
Conclusion
Clearly, basic changes are occurring among the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Changes are 
especially noted among the younger generation, many of whom have become Protestant, 
Catholic, and more recently, Muslim. These changes may reduce their visibility as ethnic 
Chinese, remove some of the sources of resentment, and thereby lead to reduced hostility
K. Sindhunata, chairperson of Bakom-PKB, the passports of those of foreign descent also have a special code 
(Tempo, March 17,1990, also April 14 and April 28,1990, in "Letters to the Editor").
28Suleeman, "Persepsi golongan keturunan," pp. 201-6.
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toward this group. No doubt the assimilationist policy of the government has been respon­
sible for many of the changes.
It is clear that acculturation is an irreversible process and is continuing at a rapid pace. 
One must distinguish, however, between the process of acculturation and the process of 
social integration as indicated by social interaction. The former is proceeding linearly as 
Chinese cultural elements disappear and elements of local culture are adopted. One can 
even talk about the emergence of an "urban culture," in particular, "Jakarta culture," to 
which the ethnic Chinese have contributed. However, the process of social integration as 
manifested in social interaction is still not going smoothly. Contrary to their expectations, 
although members of the younger generation of ethnic Chinese state that they identify as 
Indonesians, they do not feel entirely appreciated and accepted by the ethnic Indonesian 
majority. Frustration has generated an assertiveness expressed in an insistence that the 
principle of two types of citizenship, Indonesian citizens (WNRI) and aliens (WNA), be 
implemented consistently and that efforts be mutual.
One should be mindful that the role of ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian economy is still 
perceived by the ethnic Indonesian majority as very powerful. With the recent policies of 
deregulation, especially in banking, generating a proliferation of new banks or new 
branches of existing banks and causing the rush of companies (many of which are owned by 
ethnic Chinese) to "go public," their role in the economy is viewed as even more pervasive 
than before. The stereotype that all ethnic Chinese are wealthy and that they have benefited 
most from "facilities" made available by the New Order government and become big busi­
nessmen in the process has undoubtedly been reinforced by the event at Tapos. Hence 
although basic changes are occurring in the social and cultural dimensions of their lives, 
their role in the economy is the most visible to ethnic Indonesians and is the major source of 
resentment against them. It is imperative, therefore, that changes also occur in the economic 
arena.
Does normalization of relations with the PRC have any relevance to the Chinese prob­
lem? It is implicitly recognized in the Memorandum of Understanding that marked the 
resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Yet as indicated in the many 
writings on the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia that appeared in the media at the time, it is 
uncertain the Chinese problem has been resolved.
However, ultimately the government, its policies, and the implementation of these poli­
cies will determine whether relations between the ethnic Chinese minority and the ethnic 
Indonesian majority will continue to be characterized by periodic outbursts of social unrest 
with the ethnic Chinese remaining victims of scapegoating and deflected aggression or 
whether a gradual but continuous reduction in conflict situations will occur.
The ethnic Chinese should realize that it is imperative to diversify occupationally and 
residentially and to move away from overconcentration in economic activities and certain 
exclusive neighborhoods. They should realize that, having elected to become Indonesian 
citizens, they must pay equal attention to their responsibilities as well as their rights as citi­
zens. Furthermore, as a minority group they are compelled to find ways to achieve an 
acceptable accommodation with the majority population. On the other hand, for individuals, 
total assimilation is a course of action still as open today as it was in the past.

